System and method for encrypted smart card pin entry

ABSTRACT

A smart card, system, and method for securely authorizing a user or user device using the smart card is provided. The smart card is configured to provide, upon initialization or a request for authentication, a public key to the user input device such that the PIN or password entered by the user is encrypted before transmission to the smart card via a smart card reader. The smart card then decrypts the PIN or password to authorize the user. Preferably, the smart card is configured to provide both a public key and a nonce to the user input device, which then encrypts a concatenation or other combination of the nonce and the user-input PIN or password before transmission to the smart card. The smart card reader thus never receives a copy of the PIN or password in the clear, allowing the smart card to be used with untrusted smart card readers.

REFERENCE TO PRIOR APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.12/795,383 filed 7 Jun. 2010, now issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,332,935,which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/196,340filed 4 Aug. 2005, now issued as U.S. Pat. No. 7,735,132, the entiretiesof all of which are incorporated herein by reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This system relates generally to smart cards for authorizing users, andspecifically to the encryption of personal identification numbers orpasswords utilized to authenticate a user to a smart card.

TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

Smart cards, also referred to as chip cards or integrated circuit cards,are devices with an embedded integrated circuit (such as amicroprocessor and/or memory) for use as storage of sensitive data oruser authentication. Smart cards may comprise memory for storingfinancial or personal data, or private data such as private keys used inthe S/MIME (Secured Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) encryptiontechnique. Preferably, some of this data may be secured using a PIN(personal identification number) or a password as an access controlmeasure. In order to access the protected data stored in the card'smemory, a user must be validated by providing the correct PIN orpassword.

Typically, the smart card does not include a data entry device fordirect entry of a PIN or password for the purpose of userauthentication. The smart card is typically used in conjunction with asmart card reader that is in communication with an input device. Whenthe smart card is in communication with the smart card reader, a PIN orpassword may be provided in the clear by the user via the input deviceto the smart card reader. The reader may then pass the user-entered PINor password on to the smart card for verification, so that the smartcard can authenticate the user.

While this prior art smart card solution is satisfactory for hardwaresystems that are familiar to the user, such as smart card authenticationsystems used within a workplace environment where the smart card readeris trusted, such a system presents increased risk outside suchenvironments where the hardware is not trusted. Because the PIN orpassword is provided by the user to the smart card reader in the clear,the smart card reader has access to this authentication information; theuser does not know whether the smart card reader will retain a copy ofthe PIN or password, or pass the information on to an adversary.

Accordingly, it is desirable to provide a system and method forprotecting the user's PIN or password at the time it is entered via theinput device to ensure that such sensitive information is not capturedor replicated by untrusted hardware.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In drawings which illustrate by way of example only a preferredembodiment of the invention,

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a smart card and smart card system.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method of authenticating a user using a smartcard.

FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a method for decrypting or signing anelectronic message.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In accordance with a preferred embodiment, an enhanced smart card isprovided for encrypting user-entered authentication data prior toreception by a smart card reader. The smart card comprises a memory forstoring a private key, a public key, and predetermined authenticationinformation, at least the private key being stored in a secure memory;an interface for communicating with a smart card reader, transmitting achallenge comprising at least the public key to a user device via thesmart card reader, and receiving encrypted authentication informationfrom the user device via the smart card reader, the encryptedauthentication information being encrypted by the public key; aprocessor for executing a decryption algorithm on the received encryptedauthentication information using the private key to obtain decryptedauthentication information, comparing the decrypted authenticationinformation with the predetermined authentication information, andgenerating a verification signal if the decrypted authenticationinformation and the predetermined authentication information match.

Preferably, the smart card further comprises a processor and memory forgenerating and storing a nonce, and the interface is adapted to transmita challenge comprising at least the public key and the nonce and receiveencrypted authentication information wherein the information encryptedcomprises the nonce, and the processor for comparing the decryptedauthentication information is configured to compare the decryptedinformation with both the predetermined authentication information and astored nonce. The interface may also receive, via a smart card reader, arequest for authentication from the user device. The private key may beused by the user device in digitally signing or decrypting electronicmessages, but the smart card or the user device may further comprise amemory for storing a further private key and a further public key foruse in digitally signing or decrypting messages.

In a preferred embodiment, a system for authenticating a user deviceusing a smart card is provided, comprising a smart card comprising amicroprocessor and a memory for storing a private key, a public key, andpredetermined authentication information, the memory comprising securememory for storing at least the private key, and the microprocessorbeing configured to execute a decryption algorithm using the private keyand to perform a comparison of the predetermined authenticationinformation against received authentication information; a user devicefor receiving input from a user, the user device being configured toencrypt input; and a smart card reader for providing communication meansbetween the smart card and the user device; wherein when the smart cardis in communication with the user device via the smart card reader, thesmart card is configured to transmit to the user device the public key,the user device is configured to encrypt input authenticationinformation from a user using the public key and transmit the encryptedauthentication information to the smart card, and the smart card isfurther configured to decrypt the received encrypted authenticationinformation using the decryption algorithm and the private key such thatthe microprocessor may perform a comparison of the predeterminedauthentication information against the received authenticationinformation, and such that the smart card reader never receives orcommunicates unencrypted authentication information. Preferably themicroprocessor is further configured to generate a nonce and store thenonce in memory, such that when the smart card is in communication withthe user device via the smart card reader, the smart card is configuredto transmit the public key and the nonce, and the user device isconfigured to encrypt a concatenation of the nonce and inputauthentication information from a user using the public key and transmitthe information thus encrypted to the smart card, and the smart card isfurther configured to decrypt the received encrypted information usingthe decryption algorithm and the private key such that themicroprocessor may perform a comparison of the predeterminedauthentication information and the received nonce against the receivedauthentication information and the stored nonce.

Also in a preferred embodiment, a method for authenticating a userdevice using a smart card is provided, comprising the steps of:providing a smart card comprising a microprocessor and a memory forstoring a private key and a public key, the memory comprising securememory for storing the private key, a decryption algorithm, andpredetermined authentication information; transmitting a challenge to auser device, the challenge comprising the public key; receiving from theuser device a response comprising received authentication informationencrypted using the challenge; decrypting the received authenticationinformation using the private key; comparing the received authenticationinformation against the predetermined authentication information; if thereceived authentication information matches the predeterminedauthentication information, transmitting a verification signal to theuser device. Preferably, the memory of the smart card is furtherprovided with a nonce generation function, and the method furthercomprises the step of generating and storing a nonce, such that the stepof transmitting a challenge to the user device comprises transmitting achallenge comprising the public key and the nonce, and the step ofcomparing the received authentication information further comprises acomparison of the stored nonce as well as the predeterminedauthentication information with the received authentication information.

The method may further comprise the steps of transmitting a request forauthentication to the smart card before the step of transmitting achallenge to a user device; prompting a user of the user device to enterauthentication information; encrypting, at the user device, the receivedauthentication information using the challenge; transmitting to thesmart card the encrypted received authentication information; andreceiving a verification signal from the smart card. The user device maycomprise a mobile communication device, and the method may furthercomprise the step of decrypting or digitally signing an electronicmessage upon receipt of the verification signal from the smart card.

Referring to FIG. 1, a preferred embodiment of a smart card system 100is shown. The smart card system 100 comprises a smart card 110; a smartcard reader 150; and an input device 160. The input device may becomprised in a mobile communication device 170. In the context of amobile communication device 170, the smart card 110 may be used toauthorize certain functions to be carried out by the mobilecommunication device 170, such as encryption, decryption, and digitalsigning of messages sent and/or received by the mobile communicationdevice 170. If the input device 160 is comprised in a mobilecommunication device 170, then the mobile communication device 170 maycommunicate with the smart card reader 150 either by a direct wiredconnection, such as via USB (Universal Serial Bus) or by a wirelesscommunication link in accordance with a standard such as the Instituteof Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 802.11a/b/g standard forwireless local area networks, Bluetooth®, Zigbee®, and the like, orfuture standards for wireless, preferably short-range, communication.

As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, the smart card 110may be a contact smart card or a contactless smart card. A contact smartcard is preferably provided with a physical contact portion inaccordance with ISO/IEC 7816 published by the International Organizationfor Standardization, which contact portion provides a interface with thesmart card reader 150 for data communication between the card 110 andthe reader 150, and further provides any necessary power to the carditself. Preferably, a contactless smart card is provided in accordancewith ISO/IEC 10536, 14443, or 15693, which define standards forclose-coupled, proximity, and vicinity smart cards, respectively.Contactless smart cards are not required to maintain physical contactwith the reader 150 in order to function, but rather communicate withthe reader 150 with an antenna and a radiofrequency interface, and arepowered by an electromagnetic field generated at the reader 150. In thefollowing description, the interface of the smart card 110 will beunderstood to comprise the portion of the smart card, whether a contactor contactless smart card, which carries out the interface functionalityof the smart card 110. A typical form factor for the smart card 110 isthe “credit card” type form factor, although the smart card 110 may becomprised in another form factor or device that provides thefunctionality for communication with a smart card reader 150.

In a preferred embodiment, the smart card 110 is provided with amicroprocessor 114 in communication with a secure memory 118 and a lesssecure memory 122. These components may be provided in an ASIC, or inmultiple integrated circuits within the smart card 110. Themicroprocessor 114 is configured to execute any smart card operatingsystem software, and other software applications, and further providesfor the execution of various commands, such as memory-related commandsto read information from and write information to the secure memory 118(if the secure memory provided is read/write memory), or the less securememory 122, which is preferably read/write memory, and security-relatedcommands to perform authentication operations such as password checking.The microprocessor 114 and optionally the less secure memory 122communicate with an interface 128, which in turn enables the exchange ofinformation between the smart card 110 and the smart card reader 150.The content of the secure memory 122 is not available via the interfaceto a reader 150 except in accordance with a security-related commandexecuted by the microprocessor 114. The secure memory 122 may becomprised within the microprocessor 114.

The secure memory 118 of the smart card 110 comprises a storage locationfor a key 130, such as a private key for use in S/MIME decryption orsigning. The secure memory 118 further stores a decryption function 132,which is executable by the microprocessor 114, and also authenticationinformation against which user-input authentication information, such asa PIN or password, may be compared in order to authenticate a user tothe smart card. Preferably, the PIN or password is not stored in theclear, but rather is stored indirectly (for example, as a hash) in thesecure memory 118. The less secure memory 122 stores a public key and/ora certificate containing the public key 124. A nonce generation function126 may also be stored in the less secure memory 122, for execution bythe microprocessor 114.

The smart card 110 is configured such that upon initialization, whichtakes place when the smart card 110 is activated by a smart card reader150 and receives sufficient power from the smart card reader 150 tocarry out smart card functions, it transmits a challenge comprising thepublic key 124 to the smart card reader 150. The reader 150 provides thechallenge to the input device 160, which in turn is configured toreceive from the user authentication information, such as a PIN or apassword, for use in authenticating the user to the smart card 110. Theinput device 160 is further configured to encrypt the authenticationinformation input by the user using the challenge data, i.e., the publickey 124. The authentication information thus encrypted is transmittedfrom the input device 160 to the smart card reader 150, and from thesmart card reader 150 to the smart card 110. The encryptedauthentication information is passed to the decryption function 132,which accesses the private key 130 to decrypt the encryptedauthentication information to obtain the PIN or password input by theuser. The smart card 110 then executes a verification command to comparethe decrypted authentication information to the previously storedauthentication information in the secure memory 118. If the decryptedauthentication information matches the previously stored authenticationinformation, then the user is authorized by the smart card 110 and averification signal is transmitted from the smart card 110 to the inputdevice 160 via the reader 150. As will be appreciated by those skilledin the art, in this embodiment the user may be authenticated by thesmart card 110 in communication with any reader 150, whether the reader150 is trusted or not; the reader 150 at no time is provided withauthentication information (i.e., a PIN or password) in the clear.

In a most preferred embodiment, the challenge comprises both the publickey 124 and a nonce, which is generated either by the nonce generationfunction 126 or the microprocessor 114. Thus, the smart card 110 wouldbe configured to generate a challenge upon initialization comprising thepublic key 124 and the nonce, and further to store the nonce temporarilyin memory. The input device 160 would then encrypt the user's enteredauthentication information using the nonce and the public key 124, forexample by concatenating the nonce with the authentication information.The decryption function 132 would then access both the private key 130and the nonce temporarily stored in memory by the smart card in order todecrypt the received encrypted authentication information during theverification step and determine the user-entered authenticationinformation and the nonce. The smart card 110 would further beconfigured to utilize the temporarily stored nonce for a singleauthentication attempt; if the verification step failed, then the smartcard 110, if configured to issue a further challenge to the user, wouldgenerate a new nonce and transmit this new nonce as part of the furtherchallenge. By incorporating a nonce, the likelihood of a replay attackis minimized; even if a rogue smart card reader 150 captured theencrypted authentication information and a malicious user attempted toreplay this encrypted authentication information at a later time, theverification would not be successful.

Turning to FIG. 2, a preferred method for authenticating a user usingthe smart card described above is provided. The smart card 110 isdetected by the smart card reader 150 at step 200. The detection may beby means of polling an interface in the smart card reader 150 until asignal is received indicating that a smart card 110 has been activatedby the reader 150, and is ready to communicate with the reader 150. Thesmart card is then initialized at step 205, preferably by the operatingsystem internal to the smart card 110. At step 210, optionally uponreceipt of a request for authentication received from the smart cardreader 150, the smart card 110 generates a challenge comprising at leastthe public key 124, but most preferably the public key 124 and a noncegenerated using the generation function 126, and transmits thischallenge to the smart card reader 150, which in turn signals the inputdevice 160 to request authentication information (e.g., a PIN) from theuser at step 215. The input device 160 encrypts the enteredauthentication information using the challenge at step 220. Theencrypted authentication information is then transmitted to the smartcard 110 via the reader 150 at step 225, and the smart card 110 decryptsthe received encrypted authentication information at step 230 using theprivate key 130 and compares the decrypted information against thepreviously stored information on the smart card 110. If the informationmatches, then the smart card authorizes the user at step 235 and averification signal is transmitted 240 to the input device 160 via thereader 150.

Such a method may be employed in a system for encrypting and decryptingmessages using a mobile communication device 170. The mobilecommunication device 170 may comprise the input device 160. When a userof the mobile communication device 170 wishes to digitally sign amessage to be sent from the device 170, the user activates a smart card110, causing the mobile device 170 to prompt the user for authenticationinformation in accordance with the method described above. If the useris authenticated, then the mobile communication device 170 is configuredto digitally sign the message 250, as shown in FIG. 3. Similarly, when auser of the mobile device 170 in receipt of an encrypted message wishesto decrypt the message, the user may activate the smart card 110,proceed through the authentication process described above, and if theuser is authenticated, the mobile communication device 170 is configuredto decrypt the message 245. The decryption may make use of further keys130 a stored in the secure memory 118 of the smart card 110, which areprovided to the mobile communication device 170 only after the smartcard 110 authenticates the user using the public/private key pair124,130 stored on the card 110. As would be understood by those skilledin the art, the authentication of the user is necessary only when theuser wishes to either sign a message 250 or decrypt a message 245, sincethese activities typically require access to sensitive information,namely, a private key. It is not necessary for the user to beauthenticated using the method described above if the user merely wishesto encrypt a message for a recipient, since that encryption may becarried out using the recipient's public key, which may be publiclyavailable. Also, it will be understood that the public/private key pairthat is ultimately used by the mobile communication device 170 fordecryption or digitally signing a message need not be the samepublic/private key pair that is used by the smart card 110 toauthenticate the user. A public/private key pair that is used by themobile communication device 170 may be stored in memory resident in themobile communication device 170, or may likewise be stored in memory onthe smart card 110.

Various embodiments of the present invention having been thus describedin detail by way of example, it will be apparent to those skilled in theart that variations and modifications may be made without departing fromthe invention. The invention includes all such variations andmodifications as fall within the scope of the appended claims.

A portion of the disclosure of this patent document contains materialwhich is subject to copyright protection. The copyright owner has noobjection to the facsimile reproduction by any one of the patentdocument or patent disclosure, as it appears in the Patent and TrademarkOffice patent file or records, but otherwise reserves all copyrightswhatsoever.

The invention claimed is:
 1. A method implemented at a mobile device,the method comprising: receiving, over a wireless link, a challengecomprising a public key stored by an authentication device, the mobiledevice receiving the challenge from an untrusted reader device incommunication with the authentication device, the reader device beingconfigured to wirelessly communicate with the mobile device over thewireless link, the mobile device, the reader device, and theauthentication device being physically separate devices, the readerdevice and the authentication device being in wireless communicationwith each other, the mobile device comprising a user mobilecommunication device configured to send and receive messages; receivinguser-entered authentication information; encrypting the user-enteredauthentication information using the public key; transmitting forreceipt by the authentication device, over the wireless link and inresponse to the challenge, the encrypted user-entered authenticationinformation; and receiving a verification signal sent by theauthentication device over the wireless link once the encrypteduser-entered authentication information is decrypted using a private keystored by the authentication device, and is determined to matchauthentication information previously stored by the authenticationdevice; in response to receiving the verification signal, the mobiledevice being enabled to encrypt or digitally sign a message fortransmission from the mobile device, or decrypt or verify a messagereceived by the mobile device.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein thechallenge further comprises a value generated by the authenticationdevice, and the generated value is used for encrypting the user-enteredauthentication information and decrypting the encrypted user-enteredauthentication information.
 3. The method of claim 2, wherein thegenerated value is a nonce.
 4. The method of claim 1, wherein theauthentication device is a smart card.
 5. The method of claim 1, whereinthe user-entered authentication information comprises a password.
 6. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the user-entered authentication informationis received after the challenge is received.
 7. The method of claim 6,wherein the user-entered authentication information is received inresponse to a request, the request being triggered by receipt of thechallenge.
 8. The method of claim 1, further comprising theauthentication device: receiving the encrypted user-enteredauthentication information; decrypting the encrypted user-enteredauthentication information; and determining that the user-enteredauthentication information obtained by decryption matches the previouslystored authentication information.
 9. A mobile device, including: aninput device; a processor configured to: receive, over a wireless linkfrom an untrusted reader device in wireless communication with anauthentication device, a challenge comprising a public key stored by theauthentication device, the mobile device, the reader device, and theauthentication device being physically separate devices, the readerdevice and the authentication device being in wireless communicationwith each other; receive user-entered authentication information via theinput device; encrypt the user-entered authentication information usingthe public key; transmit for receipt by the authentication device, overthe wireless link and in response to the challenge, the encrypteduser-entered authentication information; and receive a verificationsignal sent by the authentication device over the wireless link once theencrypted user-entered authentication information is decrypted using aprivate key stored by the authentication device, and is determined tomatch authentication information previously stored by the authenticationdevice, in response to receiving the verification signal, the mobiledevice being enabled to encrypt or digitally sign a message fortransmission from the mobile device, or decrypt or verify a messagereceived by the mobile device.
 10. The mobile device of claim 9, whereinthe challenge further comprises a value generated by the authenticationdevice, and the generated value is used for encrypting the user-enteredauthentication information and decrypting the encrypted user-enteredauthentication information.
 11. The mobile device of claim 10, whereinthe generated value is a nonce.
 12. The mobile device of claim 9,wherein the user-entered authentication information comprises apassword.
 13. The mobile device of claim 9, wherein the user-enteredauthentication information is received after the challenge is received.14. The mobile device of claim 13, wherein the user-enteredauthentication information is received in response to a request, therequest being triggered by receipt of the challenge.
 15. Anon-transitory computer-readable medium bearing code which, whenexecuted by a processor of a mobile device, causes the mobile device toimplement the method of: receiving, over a wireless link from anuntrusted reader device in wireless communication with an authenticationdevice, a challenge comprising a public key stored by the authenticationdevice, the mobile device, the reader device, and the authenticationdevice being physically separate devices, the reader device and theauthentication device being in wireless communication with each other,the mobile device comprising a user mobile communication deviceconfigured to send and receive messages; receiving user-enteredauthentication information; encrypting the user-entered authenticationinformation using the public key; transmitting to the authenticationdevice, over the wireless link and in response to the challenge, theencrypted user-entered authentication information; and receiving averification signal sent by the authentication device over the wirelesslink once the encrypted user-entered authentication information isdecrypted using a private key stored by the authentication device, andis determined to match authentication information previously stored bythe authentication device; in response to receiving the verificationsignal, the mobile device being enabled to encrypt or digitally sign amessage for transmission from the mobile device, or decrypt or verify amessage received by the mobile device.
 16. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the challenge furthercomprises a nonce generated by the authentication device, and the nonceis used for encrypting the user-entered authentication information anddecrypting the encrypted user-entered authentication information. 17.The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein theuser-entered authentication information is received in response to arequest, the request being triggered by receipt of the challenge. 18.The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein theauthentication device is a smart card.